Bad Agent, Good Citizen? by Hill, Claire et al.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 88 Issue 5 Article 3 
2020 
Bad Agent, Good Citizen? 
Claire Hill 
University of Minnesota Law School 
Brett McDonnell 
University of Minnesota Law School 
Aaron Stenz 
University of Minnesota Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Claire Hill, Brett McDonnell, and Aaron Stenz, Bad Agent, Good Citizen?, 88 Fordham L. Rev. 1631 (). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol88/iss5/3 
This Colloquium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship 
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 




BAD AGENT, GOOD CITIZEN? 
Claire Hill,* Brett McDonnell** & Aaron Stenz*** 
INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers are agents for their principals—their clients.1  The Restatement 
(Third) of Agency sets forth an agent’s duty:  “[A]n agent has a fiduciary 
duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the 
agency relationship.”2  A good agent is a loyal agent. 
The Restatement also sets forth several important components of the duty:  
“An agent has a duty not to acquire a material benefit from a third party in 
connection with transactions conducted or other actions taken on behalf of 
the principal or otherwise through the agent’s use of the agent’s position.”3  
Further, “[a]n agent has a duty not to deal with the principal as or on behalf 
of an adverse party in a transaction connected with the agency relationship.”4  
A lawyer who violates these duties is a bad agent, in breach of her fiduciary 
duty of loyalty to her principal.5 
Lawyers also have professional obligations to the broader society.  
Notably, they cannot help their clients commit crimes, nor can they be party 
to their client’s concealment of crimes.6  Even consistent with those 
obligations, and certainly in gray areas (such as avoiding inconvenient 
knowledge),7 whether they are being good agents or bad agents for their 
clients, lawyers can help—or harm—the broader society.8 
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are very grateful for the extremely useful comments made by the participants of the 
Colloquium. 
 
 1. See generally Deborah A Demott, The Lawyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 301 
(1998). 
 2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2005). 
 3. Id. § 8.02. 
 4. Id. § 8.03. 
 5. That being said, if an agent gets consent from her principal after full disclosure, she is 
not violating her fiduciary duties. Id. § 8.06.  The examples we discuss in this Article are 
generally of agents not seeking or obtaining consent for the behavior at issue.  The exception 
involves plaintiffs who partner with lawyers to bring meritless claims. See infra Part I. 
 6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
 7. See id. § 94 cmt. g. 
 8. Of course, this construction vastly oversimplifies:  effects on broader society may be 
neutral, unknown, or amenable to different interpretations.  Significantly, reasonable people 
may disagree as to what makes something helpful or harmful to society.  Still, there is 
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This raises the possibility that an agent, such as a lawyer working for a 
client, may not just face a choice between what is best for her and her client 
but also between what is best for her client and society.  Analyses of agents’ 
behavior normally focus on whether an agent is a good agent or a bad agent—
whether or not an agent is faithfully pursuing the interests of her principal.  
But we should also consider whether a lawyer acting as a good agent is also 
promoting the public interest (i.e., a good citizen) or not (i.e., a bad citizen).  
Similarly, we should ask whether lawyers acting as bad agents are also 
harming society, or whether they may actually be promoting the public 
interest even though they are not promoting their clients’ interests. 
It is important to note that “agent” has two meanings in this context—the 
“legal” meaning and the “economic” meaning.  These two meanings have 
considerable, but not complete, overlap, especially in areas relevant to this 
Article. 
The legal meaning largely focuses on the legal relationships between the 
principal and agent, the principal and a third party with whom the agent dealt, 
and, to a lesser degree, the agent and the third party.  The legal meaning 
addresses when a principal-agent relationship is created,9 when the principal 
is bound or liable to a third party for the agent’s actions,10 and, most 
importantly for purposes of this Article, the duties owed by an agent to a 
principal.11  But nothing in this context could, or would, encourage illegal 
behavior.  It might, however, encourage behavior in a gray area, or behavior 
that is close to the line. 
By contrast, the economics meaning could, in principle, allow, if not 
encourage, illegal behavior, behavior in a gray area, or behavior that is close 
to the line.  The major focus in the literature on agents in corporate law and 
corporate governance is on “agency costs”—the respects in which agents can 
be bad agents, acting for themselves rather than their principal.12  Consider 
lawbreaking that has a positive expected value, such as obtaining a valuable 
business opportunity by bribing a foreign official, where the business 
opportunity’s expected value exceeds its expected cost—that is, the expected 
probability of detection multiplied by the expected fine or penalty. 
The legal concept of agency owes much to the economics concept.  Indeed, 
the received wisdom on corporate law fiduciary duties is that their function 
is largely to reduce agency costs.13  But someone who breaks the law on his 
principal’s behalf or encourages his principal to do so would not be 
considered under the legal concept to be a good agent who is fulfilling his 
 
sufficient consensus in theory and, to a lesser extent, in application that we think exploring 
the four different permutations is worthwhile. See infra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01. 
 10. Id. §§ 2.01–2.03. 
 11. Id. §§ 8.01–8.05. 
 12. See Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); see also Stephen A. Ross, 
The Economic Theory of Agency:  The Principal’s Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 134 (1973). 
 13. For a summary of the arguments, see generally Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, 
Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769 (2007). 
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fiduciary duties.14  For purposes of this Article, and especially insofar as our 
focus is on lawyers as agents, we will do the same:  we rule out lawbreaking 
or encouraging others to break the law as being an act of a good agent, no 
matter what the actor’s or principal’s motivation is. 
By definition, bad agents are acting for themselves when they should be 
acting for their principals.  But “acting for themselves” is a capacious 
category and may include behavior that is almost completely self-serving or 
is self-serving while also serving the public interest.  Thus, as Table 1 below 
illustrates, there are four possibilities:  bad agent/bad citizen; good agent/bad 
citizen, good agent/good citizen, and bad agent/good citizen.15  In this 
Article, we explore those four possibilities, using four specific examples. 
Table 1:  Agent Behavior 
 Bad Agent Good Agent 
Bad Citizen 
The lawyer bringing 
frivolous derivative or 




The lawyer advising 
overcompliance, to 
client’s detriment 




The easiest case is probably that of the bad agent who is also a bad citizen.  
The paradigmatic case is the oft-discussed (and oft-bemoaned) one of the 
lawyer who solicits clients to bring near-meritless suits for settlement value, 
such as shareholders suing derivatively for disclosure violations or 
governance reforms.16  The lawyers benefit by getting paid a fee, but their 
clients are hurt, insofar as they indirectly pay the fee (since the fee is paid 
from corporate coffers) and get something of almost no value—the disclosure 
or governance reforms.  The clients may also lose something potentially of 
considerable value—claims against the officers and directors if the officers 
and directors get a release from liability.  The waste of judicial resources (and 
other resources that could have been used in productive activity rather than 
pursuing or defending against the suit) is a cost to the broader society.  This 
 
 14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. c (“[A]n agent’s fiduciary relationship 
to the principal does not privilege conduct by the agent that is otherwise tortious or criminal 
although done with actual authority nor does their fiduciary relationship privilege a principal 
who demands such conduct.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
§ 16(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (“[A] lawyer must . . . proceed in a manner reasonably 
calculated to advance a client’s lawful objectives . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (2020) (providing that a certificate of incorporation may not 
exculpate directors from liability for “a knowing violation of law”). 
 15. We present these as four categories in a table, but agency and citizenship are, of 
course, on a continuum—from good to bad. 
 16. See infra Part I. 
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example is the poster child for abuse; some defenses of the practice exist, but 
not many.17 
An example of a good agent/bad citizen is a lawyer who helps clients do 
end runs around rules, regulations, or contractual provisions.  Such end runs 
can take the form of, for instance, techniques that enable companies to 
conceal the extent of their indebtedness or exaggerate the amount of their 
revenue.18 
Two final examples involve lawyer advice on compliance or fiduciary 
duties where the advice is to go beyond what the law requires.19  Perhaps this 
ultimately serves the client’s interests, taking into account the value of 
regulatory favor and reputation and the lessened likelihood of lawsuits being 
brought against the client.  But perhaps the client would have been better 
served with less conservative advice. 
This Article discusses each of the four possibilities, concluding that the 
condemnation of bad agents is far more satisfactory in the pure bad agent/bad 
citizen case and that perhaps we should revisit how we regard bad citizen 
cases, even when the agents are being good agents. 
I.  BAD AGENT/BAD CITIZEN 
Protection rackets occur when businesses pay another party, oftentimes 
mob-affiliated, for “protection” against threats from a third party or even the 
ostensible “protector.”20  In effect, the protection racket is an unsanctioned 
tax on doing business.  The behavior of the bad agent/bad citizen lawyer is 
analogous:  these lawyers offer contrived services to the clients they solicit, 
in the form of various disclosures or other concessions of limited efficacy 
from the corporate defendants, but effectively impose the same type of 
unsanctioned tax on the corporate world.  Such lawyers are arguably agents 
in name only, obtaining fees through pro forma relationships with their 
“clients” without benefitting the clients.  However, unlike protection rackets, 
which operate beyond the confines of the law, the bad agent/bad citizen 
lawyers use the law as their scourge. 
The technique of the bad agent/bad citizen lawyer is simple:  find or 
solicit21 clients to bring low-merit suits against corporations or their directors 
and then quickly settle or otherwise terminate the suits in exchange for 
minimal, nonmonetary concessions for their client, attorney’s fees paid by 
 
 17. See, e.g., Adam Badawi, Fighting Frivolous Litigation in a Multijurisdictional World, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 110 (Sean Griffith et 
al. eds., 2018). 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. See generally David Anzola et al., National Mafia-Type Organisations:  Local Threat, 
Global Reach, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF ORGANISED CRIME:  MODELLING THE DYNAMICS OF 
EXTORTION RACKETS 9 (Corinna Elsenbroich et al. eds., 2016). 
 21. See, e.g., Family Dollar Stores, Inc. (FDO), FARUQI & FARUQI LLP, 
http://www.faruqilaw.com/FDO [http://perma.cc/SV6T-PPQL] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) 
(soliciting clients for a class action challenging the sale of Family Dollar for breaches of 
fiduciary duties). 
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the corporation, and an expansive release given to the corporation’s officers 
and directors.  Once the suit is terminated and the attorney’s fees paid, the 
lawyer rinses and repeats. 
The paradigmatic example of this pattern arises in the context of merger 
litigation.  In the early 2010s, over 90 percent of large mergers (with 
transaction sizes of over $100 million) of public companies were challenged 
in court.22  Many of these suits alleged breaches of fiduciary duty under state 
corporate laws23 or federal law in the form of Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Rule 14a-924 (governing misstatements or omissions in 
the proxy statements of public companies),25 arguing that the boards of 
directors engaged in flawed sale processes or failed to adequately disclose 
information necessary for shareholders to vote on the transaction.26  In 
essence, lawyers find shareholders either through press releases27 or 
extensive existing relationships,28 sue for an injunction on the transaction, 
and then collect their fees. 
From 2009 to 2016, these lawyers “earned” their fees primarily through 
disclosure-only settlements.29  Class action suits—often with only a single 
named shareholder—alleging inadequate disclosures followed virtually 
every large merger or acquisition, with most settling for additional 
disclosures by the defendant directors (often details of negotiations or the 
compensation of involved bankers)30 without any monetary recovery for the 
plaintiff class, in exchange for a broad release of liability preventing further 
suits on the same facts.31  Despite the absence of evidence of any statistically 
significant reaction by shareholders to these disclosures,32 the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys would receive fees averaging in the six-figure range, paid by the 
corporation, for suits that could be conducted with relatively little effort and 
 
 22. See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2014, 
at 2 (Feb. 22, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2567902&download=yes [https://perma.cc/46NV-78UU]. 
 23. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2020). 
 24. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2019). 
 25. Sean J. Griffith, Class Action Nuisance Suits:  Evidence from Frequent Filer 
Shareholder Plaintiffs, in CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF CLASS ACTIONS (Brian 
Fitzpatrick & Randall Thomas eds., forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 9–11). 
 26. Sean J. Griffith, Innovation in Disclosure-Based Shareholder Suits, 69 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 927, 928 (2019). 
 27. See id. at 929. 
 28. See Griffith, supra note 25 (manuscript at 3–4) (noting that between 2004 and 2018, 
seven different frequent-filer plaintiffs filed a total of 281 suits, the majority of which were 
merger suits; the plaintiffs mostly had consistent and enduring relationships with their 
lawyers). 
 29. See id. (manuscript at 5). 
 30. Nonmonetary recovery occasionally includes amendments to the merger agreement or 
deal-protection provisions. Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in 
Merger Litigation:  An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 
566 (2015). 
 31. Dan Awrey et al., Resolving the Crisis in U.S. Merger Regulation:  A Transatlantic 
Alternative to the Perpetual Litigation Machine, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 13–14 (2018). 
 32. See Fisch et al., supra note 30, at 586. 
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filed en masse.33  While they were still subject to approval by courts in a 
fairness hearing, settlements (and fees) were nevertheless routinely 
approved, even when they involved low-value disclosures.34 
In 2016, Delaware limited the efficacy of the disclosure-only settlement as 
a vehicle for attorney’s fees.  In In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation,35 
the Court of Chancery denied a disclosure-only settlement, requiring 
disclosures to address a material misrepresentation or omission for the 
disclosure-only settlement to be approved.36  The plaintiffs’ bar adapted, 
filing similar suits in other states or federal court37 or seeking mootness fees 
(fees paid by the corporation to the plaintiffs’ attorneys) if the defendants, 
without formally settling, voluntarily made the demanded disclosures in 
response to the suit.38 
Similarly frivolous suits aimed primarily at generating attorney’s fees also 
arise in other contexts.39  Derivative suits for breaches of fiduciary duties 
outside of the merger context filed quickly on the heels of corporate crises, 
often settling for weak corporate governance reforms and attorney’s fees, are 
one example.40  Others include proxy suits outside of the merger context 
challenging the adequacy of disclosures under Rule 14a-9, and traditional 
securities law claims.41  Ultimately, all of these feature frequent-filer firms 
and plaintiffs, rapid filings with little legal and investigative effort, and the 
payment of attorney’s fees by the defendants despite little benefit to the 
plaintiff.42 
Corporations settle in these situations because it is cheaper, easier, and less 
risky to simply accept the effective tax than to vigorously contest the suit, 
especially in the context of merger litigation.  Merger participants want to 
proceed quickly while avoiding the risk of an injunction or further discovery, 
motivating quick settlement or other resolution of the lawsuit in which the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers still get paid.43 
 
 33. Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV. 
603, 625 (2018); see also Fisch et al., supra note 30, at 568–69. 
 34. See Griffith, supra note 26, at 932–33. 
 35. 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 36. Id. at 894, 898. 
 37. See Griffith, supra note 26, at 935, 939; see also Griffith, supra note 25 (manuscript 
at 10) (noting a spike in shareholder suits filed in federal court following Trulia and a 
corresponding decrease in similar state court suits). 
 38. See generally Jack B. Jacobs et al., ‘Mootness Fees’ in Deal Litigation:  An Argument 
for a Different Approach, BLOOMBERG L.:  CORP. L. & ACCOUNTABILITY REP. (Mar. 28, 2017) 
(available at https://www.sidley.com/-/media/publications/bloomberg-bna-corporate-
counsel-weekly_mootness-fees-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UYQ-L3F7]). 
 39. Griffith, supra note 25 (manuscript at 2, 5). 
 40. See Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit:  How to Fix Shareholder 
Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2015); see also Jessica 
Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom:  An Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1749, 1799–800 (2010). 
 41. See generally Griffith, supra note 40. 
 42. See id. at 9–10.  See generally Griffith, supra note 25. 
 43. See Adam B. Badawi & David H. Webber, Does the Quality of the Plaintiffs’ Law 
Firm Matter in Deal Litigation?, 41 J. CORP. L. 102, 103–07 (2015); Elliott J. Weiss & 
Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride:  How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes 
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Beyond their technical similarities, these suits share a pivotal common 
thread:  the “benefits” that these lawyers obtain for their clients are of little 
value to the plaintiffs themselves and, indeed, may even be harmful insofar 
as attorney’s fees are paid by the corporation—thereby reducing its value—
and claims that potentially have real value are released.  Even in the context 
of mootness dismissals, which only release the claims of the plaintiffs that 
brought the suit rather than barring future suits by an entire class of 
shareholders, the supplemental disclosures are often made mere days before 
the transaction is completed, effectively precluding the ability of other 
shareholders to react and bring their own claims.44  Regardless, the attorneys 
are still paid, suggesting that many of these cases are brought for the benefit 
of the attorney rather than the client. 
These abuses negatively affect society.  First, like the protection racket, 
these suits increase the cost of doing business without providing 
corresponding benefits to society:  corporations and their shareholders are 
forced to pay off the lawyers and sacrifice the use of capital that could spur 
significant growth or achieve other desirable social ends.  Second, the large 
number of filings bogs down an already backlogged judiciary.  Third, these 
suits serve important roles in curbing managerial misconduct, even if their 
efficacy is sometimes questioned.45  Abuses of these suits force the legal 
system to react by raising the bar for successful claims.  Although this may 
help weed out frivolous claims, it also reduces the likelihood that weaker, but 
nevertheless meritorious, claims can succeed.  Finally, increasing the 
obstacles to litigation potentially reduces the efficacy of the specter of 
litigation as a check on corporate managers.46  Indeed, in the sense that these 
suits may, generally speaking, help maximize shareholder value, raising the 
bar that even meritorious suits must clear as a deterrent to frivolous suits may 
be more costly to shareholders in the aggregate than the costs of the frivolous 
suits themselves.47 
This picture is, admittedly, deliberately one-sided.  First, even if these 
cases become more difficult, the plaintiffs’ bar can adapt, preserving the 
specter of litigation’s ability to constrain managerial bad behavior.48  Second, 
 
Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1801–04 (2004); Griffith, supra note 25 
(manuscript at 11).  Similarly, in more prototypical derivative litigation, settlement is driven 
by the timing of the underlying regulatory action. Awrey et al., supra note 31, at 15; see also 
In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945 n.4 (Del. Ch. 2010) (citing empirical 
evidence that frequent-filers settle particularly quickly). 
 44. See Griffith, supra note 26, at 941–42. 
 45. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder 
Litigation:  Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 134–35 (2004). 
 46. See, e.g., Kevin M. LaCroix, Should Shareholder Derivative Litigation Be 
Eliminated?, D&O DIARY (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.dandodiary.com/2017/10/articles/ 
shareholders-derivative-litigation/shareholder-derivative-litigation-eliminated/ 
[https://perma.cc/793Y-2CSM]. 
 47. See generally Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Talley, Being True to Trulia:  Do 
Disclosure-Only Settlements in Merger Objection Lawsuits Harm Shareholders? (Mar. 7, 
2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3347327 [https://perma.cc/H8P8-5A2D]. 
 48. Griffith, supra note 25 (manuscript at 14). 
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the development of the law through these cases is a public good.  Third, at 
least in the case of ongoing relationships between frequent-filer plaintiffs and 
frequent-filer plaintiffs’ firms, there is a cognizable chicken-and-egg 
argument:  it is unclear whether it is the lawyer or the client that is driving 
the filing of suits.49  If frequent-filer shareholders are indeed the driving force 
behind the mass filing of nuisance suits and frequent-filer law firms are 
simply following their clients’ wishes, the firms are more similar to the good 
agent/bad citizen lawyer than they are to the bad agent/bad citizen lawyer.  
Finally, in the real world, many cases will fall into a gray area, with the 
extremes—clearly meritorious suits and suits clearly lacking in merit—at the 
ends of a continuum, more important as theoretical markers and quite rare in 
practice.  Still, exaggerated though it may be, we maintain that what we 
describe is a real phenomenon—an example of a bad agent who is also a bad 
citizen. 
II.  GOOD AGENT/BAD CITIZEN:  THE EXAMPLE OF FINANCIAL 
MANEUVERING 
Lawyers help their clients structure financial instruments and transactions 
that comply with the law.  But sometimes, what the client wants, or what the 
lawyers advise, is a financial instrument or transaction that complies with the 
letter of the law while violating its spirit.50  There may be ways, too, of 
complying “literally” with contractual restrictions that also violate those 
restrictions’ spirits.  And there may be ways to structure financial instruments 
and transactions to game differences among different regulatory or other 
regimes.  For instance, a financial instrument could be structured so that it 
would count as debt for tax purposes, allowing the interest to be deductible, 
but equity for other purposes, so it could be part of the company’s “capital” 
and thus, among other consequences, potentially help the company to qualify 
for a higher credit rating.51 
Some techniques of this sort start off being legal but are subsequently 
made illegal; some are legal and stay legal, and some stay in a gray area.  
 
 49. See id. 
 50. One of us, individually and with coauthors, has written extensively on this subject. 
See generally CLAIRE A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS:  
PROMOTING GOOD BUSINESS THROUGH CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT (2015); Philip A. Curry, 
Claire Hill & Francesco Parisi, Creating Failures in the Market for Tax Planning, 26 VA. TAX 
REV. 943 (2007); Kristin E. Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts, Categories, and Compliance 
in the Regulatory State, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1151 (2010); Claire A. Hill, Tax Lawyers Are People 
Too, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1065 (2007) [hereinafter Hill, Tax Lawyers]; Claire A. Hill, Why 
Financial Appearances Might Matter:  An Explanation for ‘Dirty Pooling’ and Some Other 
Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 141 (1997) [hereinafter Hill, Financial 
Appearances].  Two other noteworthy articles on the subject are Victor Fleischer, Regulatory 
Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010) and Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the 
Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation:  Some Initial Reflections, 69 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002). 
 51. See generally THOMAS A. HUMPHREYS, TAX DEDUCTIBLE EQUITY AND OTHER 
HYBRIDS IN THE US—A BRIEF HISTORY AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS (2018), 
https://media2.mofo.com/documents/taxdeductiblehybrid.pdf [https://perma.cc/R55T-
S4JW]. 
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New techniques are continually being developed, especially in response to 
what regulators would characterize as “plugging a loophole.”  The loophole 
is plugged, only for another to be discovered and exploited.  The back-and-
forth with regulators can be quite lucrative for the lawyers engaged in 
loophole discovery and exploitation. 
Sometimes, the regulators give in, such that the techniques stop being 
useful.  For instance, techniques to structure unincorporated business 
organizations to avoid entity-level tax became unnecessary when regulators 
decided to allow business organizations to choose whether or not they would 
be subject to entity-level tax by simply “checking a box.”52  And the 
transaction structure to reincorporate a U.S. company in a foreign jurisdiction 
to minimize taxes (“inversions”) became unnecessary when tax rates were 
changed so that inversions no longer offered an advantage.53  Companies 
(and their lawyers) used to spend significant effort (and money) structuring 
business combination transactions to qualify for “pooling” accounting 
treatment.54  If two companies’ financial statements were combined—
pooled—rather than one company being deemed to have purchased the other, 
there was no line item for “goodwill,” the difference between the purchase 
price and the fair value of the assets.  Since accounting rules then required 
goodwill to be “amortized”—that is, treated as wearing out or being used up 
over time—the effect was to reduce (accounting) earnings.  Thus, pooling 
treatment was much preferred, since the transaction did not create 
amortizable goodwill.  The earnings of two “pooled” companies would be 
higher than the earnings of those two companies if combined via one 
company’s purchase of the other.  The rules were changed to limit 
amortization of goodwill,55 rendering the techniques used to obtain pooling 
treatment unnecessary. 
A recent example of financial maneuvering involves Donald Trump, 
whose Bedminster golf club has eight goats on the premises, qualifying the 
club as a “farm” and saving it close to $90,000 per year in taxes.56  In a 
testament to how common financial maneuvering is, the use of this 
 
 52. The change, allowing entities to “check the box” and thereby choose whether or not 
to be subject to entity-level taxation, was made in 1996. See Simplification of Entity 
Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584 (Dec. 18, 1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 
301, 602). 
 53. JANE G. GRAVELLE & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45736, THE 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE 2017 TAX REVISION:  PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 14–16 (2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45736.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4DV-YFFD]. 
 54. See generally Richard Y. Roberts, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at 
the Second Annual Conference on Financial Reporting:  Time for Review of Pooling Criteria 
(Nov. 1, 1991), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1991/110191roberts.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
7857-898H]); Sujeet Indap, The Pool Is Closed, Part 2—a History, FIN. TIMES:  ALPHAVILLE 
(Mar. 11, 2014), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2014/03/11/1794812/the-pool-is-closed-part-2-a-
history/ [https://perma.cc/HR54-Q6L4]. 
 55. Summary of Statement No. 142, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, https://www.fasb.org/ 
summary/stsum142.shtml [https://perma.cc/5UNZ-XS7Z] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). 
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“loophole” is apparently quite common; people who own plausibly sized 
plots of land in the relevant area expect to use it, and routinely do.57  Do we 
regard the “entrepreneur” who discovered, or even pushed for, the loophole 
to be a worse citizen than the later users, especially when the use has become 
the norm and has even been priced into the property?  The answer would 
appear to be yes, for two reasons.  First, the entrepreneur who discovers the 
loophole does more harm by creating a maneuver that many others will use 
than those others do individually.  Second, once a loophole becomes 
widespread and common, its societal harm may seem to be, or actually be, 
smaller than was the case at the time it was initially found. 
In all of these examples of financial maneuvering, the lawyer helps enrich 
her client, but society is impoverished.  The law of fiduciary duty, for agents 
in general and lawyers in particular, already addresses this possibility where 
society has made the underlying behavior illegal:  lawyers are certainly not 
required, nor are they even allowed, to break the law even when doing so 
helps their clients.58  But what should we say about lawyers who enable (or 
even invent) such financial shenanigans when they are not illegal? 
III.  GOOD CITIZEN:  GOOD AGENT/BAD AGENT 
The third and fourth cases involve the lawyer acting as a good citizen.  
Consider a lawyer advising a company’s directors and officers on their 
fiduciary duties regarding compliance with environmental laws in an 
industry where those laws strongly affect the company.  Similar to other areas 
with complex, ambiguous, and sometimes contestable laws, the company 
may decide to aggressively test the limits of what is allowed, or follow the 
spirit and letter of the law, getting away with much less.  For instance, 
consider auto companies that chose to comply with California’s emission 
standards even though they could have tried to fight California and side with 
the Trump administration’s weaker Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
standards.59  Or, consider an energy company deciding how much to protect 
against methane leakage when engaging in hydraulic fracking.  There is a 
complicated and evolving mix of federal and state regulations on fracking; 
the Trump EPA is in the process of weakening Obama-era regulations, but 
 
 57. Discussion with Sean Griffith, T. J. Maloney Chair in Bus. Law, Fordham Univ. Sch. 
of Law, at the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics Colloquium:  
Colloquium on Corporate Lawyers (Oct. 11, 2019).  Not surprisingly, these types of loopholes 
exist and are taken advantage of in many places. See, e.g., Katherine Gustafson, Goat Herd!  
The Secret Tax Trick of Trump and Hollywood A-Listers, FORBES (Sept. 26, 2016, 9:00 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/katherinegustafson/2016/09/26/one-thing-trumps-tax-returns-
hide-his-herd-of-goats-yes-goats [https://perma.cc/QHK5-HQX7]; see also Eric Kiefer, 
Trump’s N.J. ‘Goat Farmer’ Tax Break:  Do You Qualify?, PATCH (Aug. 17, 2017, 9:00 AM), 
https://patch.com/new-jersey/westorange/trump-s-n-j-goat-farmer-tax-break-do-you-qualify 
[https://perma.cc/D9RX-CL2H]. 
 58. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 59. Catherine Powell, We the People:  These United Divided States, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2685, 2734 (2019). 
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the deregulation is being legally contested.60  Enforcement of existing rules 
is weak.61 
In both cases, taking actions that lead to lower carbon emissions would 
generally be seen as acting as a good citizen, given the role that carbon 
emissions play in climate change.  Of course, that itself is contested, to a 
significant extent because of differing views as to the facts surrounding 
climate change, but competing values and visions of the world are also 
involved.  We consider in more depth the contestability of what counts as 
being a good or bad citizen later.62  For present purposes, assume that actions 
to reduce a company’s carbon emissions help society. 
Lawyers advising a company may have a variety of motivations that 
incline them to advocate for aggressive carbon emission reductions.  Some 
align with the interests of the company,63 but some do not.  The lawyer may 
care deeply about the effect climate change is having on the world and may 
want to be part of the solution, not part of the problem.  Indeed, the lawyer 
may have gotten the job to advise companies on these matters precisely to 
advance her own personal agenda.  If so, perhaps she is an even better citizen, 
and a worse agent, if she is deliberately pursuing a career in advising on 
compliance to help the world respond to climate change rather than to help 
her advance her clients’ interests.  She may believe that having a reputation 
as being environmentally responsible will attract the company’s potential 
employees, customers, and some types of investors, increasing the 
company’s long-run profitability.64  She may want to improve her own 
reputation for providing responsible advice, thinking that will attract 
potential clients or ease her future interactions with regulators.  She may like 
more aggressive compliance because it involves more time spent advising 
the client, leading to higher legal fees. 
Sometimes, the aggressive emission reductions will be in the company’s 
interest, perhaps because the company pursues and benefits from positive 
reputation.  That then becomes a case of good agent/good citizen.  Much of 
the contemporary focus on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) activism in corporate 
governance asserts a strong convergence between shareholders’ long-term 
 
 60. See Blake A. Watson, Nullify, Postpone, Suspend, Stay, and Replace:  The Trump 
Administration and the Methane Waste Prevention Rule, 44 U. DAYTON L. REV. 363, 365–66 
(2019). 
 61. Fracking:  Regulatory Failures and Delays, GREENPEACE, https:// 
www.greenpeace.org/usa/global-warming/issues/fracking/regulatory-failures-and-delays/ 
[https://perma.cc/R2ZA-TFVF] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). 
 62. See infra Part V. 
 63. Consider Rule 2.1 of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct:  “In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment 
and render candid advice.  In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other 
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to 
the client’s situation.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). 
 64. See generally Claire A. Hill, Caremark as Soft Law, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 681 (2018) 
[hereinafter Hill, Caremark]; Claire A. Hill, Marshalling Reputation to Minimize Problematic 
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interests and action that benefits various corporate stakeholders and the 
public interest due to positive reputational effects.65  Presumably, this is true 
at least some of the time.  But some of the time it is not, which presents the 
interesting case where the lawyer is a bad agent but a good citizen.  The 
aggressive compliance benefits society, but it is costly for the company in 
both the long and short run.  Positive reputational benefits do not outweigh 
the costs.  The prevailing optimism, assuming as it does the convergence of 
shareholder and stakeholder interests, is not always warranted.  Perhaps it is 
frequently not warranted.  Some companies may have intrinsically 
environmentally unsound products that simply cannot support a clean 
reputation.  Their employees may have skills wedded to that product, and 
their customers may be intermediate, rather than final, consumers who do not 
much care about environmental “wokeness.”  A company devoted purely to 
mining coal is an example.  The business model is inherently dirty.  The 
company’s attempts to clean up its product and operations beyond the 
minimum legal requirements may be good for the environment and 
humanity, but it will just mean lower profits or higher losses. 
IV.  WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE A BAD AGENT? 
A bad agent pursues her own interests rather than those of her principal, 
often at the principal’s expense.  This Article has demonstrated that one can 
be a bad agent while being a good citizen or, conversely, a good agent while 
being a bad citizen66:  what is best for the client is not always best for society.  
We argue below, in this Part and the next Part, that what is best for society is 
complicated; here, we argue that what is best for the client can be 
complicated too, notably in the important context of clients that are business 
corporations.67 
Some commentators argue that corporations should pursue the interests of 
their major stakeholders (shareholders, employees, customers, creditors, 
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 66. See supra Parts II–III. 
 67. See generally Brett McDonnell, The Corrosion Critique of Benefit Corporations, 
(Sept. 9, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=3450747 [https://perma.cc/J4U8-G8WW]. 
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suppliers, communities, the environment),68 and with the rise of the benefit 
corporation, some companies have committed to such a purpose, or at least 
something close to it.69  If this view of what corporations should do was the 
general understanding, at least in principle, a good agent for such 
corporations would necessarily be a good citizen as well.70  But the prevailing 
understanding, at least in the United States, has been that corporations should 
be run in the best interests of their shareholders, and that shareholders’ 
interests are understood in terms of maximizing their long-term financial 
return.71  With such an understanding, a split between good agent and good 
citizen becomes possible, and this understanding is implicit in our discussion 
above. 
Even on that prevailing understanding, it is possible for the shareholders 
of a particular corporation to choose a different goal, focusing on achieving 
some specific social good as well as achieving a financial return for 
shareholders.  And nonprofit corporations’ focus on just a specific charitable 
goal, foregoing financial return for shareholders.  But even in such companies 
that pursue specific social goals, there can be a gap between being a good 
agent and a good citizen.  A charitable enterprise may do a good job at 
pursuing its charitable goal while causing other sorts of harms, or vice versa.  
Consider, for instance, a hospital that provides excellent care for its patients 
but has lousy pay and unduly stressful conditions for its nurses that may 
violate employment law standards, pursues borderline illegal schemes to 
increase payments from the government, and dumps toxic waste carelessly 
in possible violation of environmental regulations. 
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A concern for reputation may narrow the gap between the client’s and 
society’s goals; a good agent to a client concerned with having a “good” 
reputation would presumably be a good citizen as well.  If certain valued 
groups of shareholders, employees, or customers prefer to associate with 
companies that they see as socially responsible, then doing good may be in 
the company’s best interest.72  But there are limits to the “kumbaya” 
prospects suggested by such reputational concerns.  Not all companies have 
shareholders, employees, or customers who are so socially minded.  And 
even where they are socially minded, outside shareholders, customers, and 
potential employees may not have much information about how well a 
company is really behaving.  This raises the possibility of greenwashing, 
where a company holds itself out as socially responsible to attract groups 
who care about, say, the environment but does not actually behave socially 
responsibly.73  Greenwashing reopens the gap between corporate and social 
goals. 
Reputational effects are also complicated by the existence of different 
constituencies.  Employees, investors, customers, and regulators, as well as 
other constituencies, may have differing ideas as to what social goals and 
values should be pursued.74  This mirrors the question discussed in the next 
Part as to the ambiguity and contestability of social goals.75 
The bad agent/good citizen case also complicates the standard story of the 
motivations of bad agents.  In the standard bad agent story, the agent is 
simply enriching herself at the expense of her principal, where “enriching” is 
understood in terms of narrow self-interested goals.76  The agent gets money 
or other valuable items (land, confidential information, etc.) that belong to 
the principal.  Slightly more subtly, she may give less time, effort, and 
attention to her principal than she should. 
But some of the motivations that lead to the bad agent/good citizen case 
look less morally dubious.  Consider the lawyer advising an oil company to 
take more costly precautions to avoid methane leakage in fracking than 
current regulations probably require.  She probably cares deeply about the 
threat posed by climate change and does not want to be implicated in abetting 
a client in actions that will worsen that threat, even though those actions are 
likely legal and profit-maximizing.  That motivation is not selfish in any 
obvious sense.  Perhaps the motivation can be seen as suspect in an argument 
used by some defenders of the shareholder wealth maximization norm, who 
argue that such agents are imposing their own values in using others’ (i.e., 
shareholders) money where those others may not agree with the agent’s 
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priorities regarding how to spend it.77  Here again, the contestability of what 
the public good entails raises its ugly head. 
V.  BAD CITIZENS, GOOD CITIZENS 
In the bad agent/bad citizen cases—at least in the paradigmatic one 
discussed above—what makes the lawyer a bad agent is having a business 
model or practice that seeks to generate money without generating a needed 
or desired service.  The lawyer develops a cheap modus operandi—“cookie 
cutter” complaints to be filed in cases “brought” by clients generated by a 
cheap but effective advertising campaign.  The lawyer is positioning himself 
as a tax assessor and collector; once the tax is paid, the lawyer goes elsewhere 
to assess and collect another tax.  The tax is used for the lawyer’s personal 
purposes, not those of the greater society.  Any societally beneficial effect 
would be accidental—the incremental incentive to improve disclosure and 
governance is trivial and is outweighed by the associated costs—and the 
general tax is presumably harmful to society insofar as it makes business 
more costly than it “should” be.  Thus, the lawyer is a bad agent and bad 
citizen. 
In the good citizen cases, the analysis is far more complex, insofar as what 
it means to be a good and bad citizen is itself more complex.  Commentators 
can and do disagree as to whether parties have a duty to comply maximally, 
or more minimally, with regulations.78  To what extent is attempting to 
minimize one’s regulatory obligations permissible or even desirable? 
Tax provides an excellent example to illustrate the divergent views.  What 
attitude towards tax planning does a good citizen have?  Some people think 
that people in government are generally smart and well-intentioned.  They 
may also think that the enterprise of government is a good one:  it raises 
money to redistribute and limits profits by requiring caution and financial 
cushions.  Such people are apt to think good citizenship requires a more 
maximal approach to tax compliance and a limited use of tax planning. 
Others may think far less highly of the government.  They may think 
people in government are apt to be incompetent, corrupt, or both and that 
people can and should be more self-reliant.  Such people may favor far more 
limited government.  They may also think people generally will engage in 
minimalist compliance:  why be the one sap who pays up when nobody else 
is doing so and the money is going to people who lounge around on the couch 
eating bonbons when they should and could be productive?  Stated 
differently, depending on one’s views as to government, taxes, and related 
matters, one will have a different view as to what good citizenship requires.  
Consider a person who does nothing to minimize her tax burden.  Some might 
consider this person to be a good citizen in this respect; some might consider 
the behavior neutral; and some might consider it bad, on grounds that 
government spends money on harmful things (like bureaucrats who make and 
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enforce intrusive regulations) or that people can do a better job with their 
own money, saving or driving demand through consumption. 
There is no principled way to resolve the disagreement, insofar as it turns 
on first principles and unresolvable empirical inquiries.  To what extent is 
government apt to “get it right”?  What are the motives and aptitudes of those 
who make and enforce the rules at issue?  Additionally, to what extent is 
respecting rules and rule-enforcers a good thing?  And to what extent is 
“pushing the envelope” good to either remedy government’s use of a too-
blunt instrument or simply to push back, for principled reasons, against 
maximal compliance?  So, a lawyer pushing for maximal compliance might 
or might not be a good citizen; what might make a lawyer a bad agent in these 
cases is, perhaps, concern for her own reputation (or even her own values) 
when her client would take a more instrumental or minimalist view of 
compliance.  Consider a company polluting as much as the law allows; the 
lawyer might want the company to pollute less and give advice accordingly, 
even if doing so was not profit-maximizing for the company.79  There are 
many other complexities in making this determination.  Returning to 
financial maneuvering, consider who is affected by the maneuvering and how 
they are affected.  Markets and others are affected when a company uses 
techniques that make it appear to have less debt, or more revenue, than it 
actually has.  Enron provides a dramatic example of a company’s collapse 
after doing both of these things.80  Another example is some uses of cross-
currency swaps, such as the cross-currency swap that allowed Greece to join 
the eurozone.  There were significant negative effects on the world economy 
as information about Greece’s true financial situation became clear.81  But, 
sometimes, it is not clear who is fooled and to what extent.  There is 
considerable evidence that certain sorts of “balance sheet management” 
techniques are largely taken into account by the markets.82 
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For purposes of this analysis, we assume a middle-ground view of 
compliance:  being a good citizen should not require being maximalist about 
compliance, but it does require some distance from the absolute end of the 
minimalist line, including, presumptively, not having a business model, the 
point of which is to get “away with” as much as one can.83 
CONCLUSION 
Lawyers are supposed to promote their clients’ interests.  Especially in the 
litigation context, the possibility that doing so might be counter to society’s 
interests is acknowledged.  But lawyers, as zealous advocates, are supposed 
to be facing other equally zealous advocates; society is thereby supposed to 
be protected.  Similarly, in the classic economics worldview, ideally, A’s 
self-interest dukes it out with B’s; government intervention is called for when 
there is some sort of market imperfection that impedes a fair and vigorous 
fight.  Of course, the existence of imperfections—in all spheres—is generally 
acknowledged.  The problem, though, is that analyses and salient examples 
of bad agents—such as the paradigmatic plaintiffs’ lawyer filing “cookie-
cutter” complaints that they intend to, and do, settle quickly with money for 
themselves and very little, if anything, for their clients—also involve bad (or 
at least neutral) citizens.  These agents’ principal aim is to benefit themselves, 
whatever the effect on their clients (or, often, third parties).  We have argued, 
though, that there are “bad” agents, not fully serving their principals, who are 
doing good for society, and that criticism of such agents is misplaced.  
Nobody would, we presume, use as a paradigmatic case of a bad agent a 
lawyer who counseled against her clients’ lawbreaking even though an 
irrefutable cost-benefit analysis indicated that the expected benefit to the 
client of doing so was enormously high.  This suggests that the concept of 
good agent embeds at least some consideration of societal interest. 
As already noted, both the general law of agency and the particular law 
governing the duty of lawyers to their clients acknowledge that 
agents/lawyers do not fulfill their duty to their principal/client—indeed, they 
violate that duty—when they help them break the law.84  This rightly goes 
some ways towards recognizing the importance of good citizenship as well 
as good agency.  But what of circumstances where the behavior in question 
is not clearly illegal and, indeed, may even be clearly legal?  What, if any, 
scope do and should lawyers have to counsel action that will help, or at least 
not harm, society even if doing so will hurt their client?  In terms of our four 
categories, does the fiduciary duty of lawyers require that, so long as the 
behavior is legal, a lawyer acting as a good agent but bad citizen is fulfilling 
her duty while one acting as a bad agent but good citizen is not? 
The ethical rules governing lawyers seem to leave some room for the 
values of good citizenship.  Rule 2.1 of the Model Rules of Professional 
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Conduct provides that in a lawyer’s representation of a client, the lawyer 
“shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.  
In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other 
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may 
be relevant to the client’s situation.”85  The comments to this rule further 
provide that “[i]t is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical 
considerations in giving advice.  Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as 
such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions 
and may decisively influence how the law will be applied.”86 
The rule and comments leave some ambiguity as to the proper scope of 
moral, ethical, and similar considerations.  Are those considerations relevant 
only insofar as they may affect the best interests of the client?  Are they 
relevant only insofar as the client is willing to accept their relevance?  As we 
have seen, even with for-profit corporations, a broad understanding of what 
may affect long-term profitability can go a long way to reconciling being a 
good agent with being a good citizen, but it cannot go all the way. 
We believe that Rule 2.1 should be interpreted to allow lawyers to render 
advice to clients in favor of actions that may promote the public interest while 
hurting the interest of their client, even understanding the latter interest 
broadly.  After all, the point of law and the legal system ultimately is to 
promote the public interest.  Lawyers have a special relationship to the legal 
system and, hence, to the public interest.  The first line of the preamble to the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct is:  “A lawyer, as a member of the legal 
profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a 
public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”87 
But perhaps one key word in Rule 2.1 gives a limiting principle to how far 
lawyers can and should go in rendering such advice.  That word is “candid.”88  
A lawyer must render candid advice.  If a lawyer believes that her advice 
would advance the public good but may hurt her client’s personal interests, 
she should explain that to her client.  Let the client make the final choice 
between public and private interest.  If the lawyer is upset with how a client 
chooses, she can always choose to cease representing that client. 
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